The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral
Resources' Bill

F. M. AUBURN*

On November 2, 1971, Senator Metcalf introduced the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Bill,1 drafted by the American Mining
Congress. The Bill is designed to provide the Secretary of the Interior with authority to promote the orderly development of the
hard mineral resources of the deep seabed pending adoption of an
international regime. According to Senator Metcalf, it is structured to order only the affairs of U.S. nationals.2 The introduction of the Bill, whether it becomes law or not,8 represents a major advance in the seabed debate requiring detailed analysis. If the
Bill does not become law, there can be little doubt that similar legislation will soon be requested. This may be shown from a brief
review of the circumstances preceding the presentation of the Bill.
Commercial manganese nodule exploration has now reached the
stage of exploitation. A Japense government-supported consortium
has successfully tested a continuous line bucket system for recov* Faculty of Law, Univ. of Auckland, N.Z.
1. S. Res. 2801, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
2. 117 CONG. REc., 17,491 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1971) (remarks of Sen.
Metcalf).
3. The Senators sponsoring the Bill did not necessarily endorse each of
its provisions.
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ering nodules at water depths of 12,000 feet.4 Deepsea Ventures
plans to operate a 1,000,000 ton per year nodule processing plant
by 1975 or 1976, the nodules are to be extracted from a 4,000 square
mile mine site in the Pacific, between the continental United States
and Hawaii. 5 Hughes Tool Company is reported to have ordered a
35,000 ton prototype deep-sea mining ship capable of operating
in depths of more than 10,000 feet which is due to be working in
1973. 6 The company has not specifically stated that it is working
on manganese nodules, but this may be inferred from the nature
of activities envisioned. 7 The French Government, in cooperation with private industry, has begun work on analysis of nodules
raised near the Tuamotu Islands in 1970 and 1971.8 The Soviet Union has launched a Comecon International Coordinating Center of
Marine Exploration to undertake joint expeditions to select suitable mineral exploitation sites. 9 Other enterprises are involved in
research. 10 A feature of several of these projects is cooperation
between nationals of various developed states. Dr. Mero of Ocean
Mining Co. is assisting the Japanese." Deepsea Ventures is associated with a large West German firm.' 2
The investments already made generate their own momentum
for the expansion of the industry. Knowledge and expertise invested in such extensive projects cannot be veiled in secrecy for
long.' 3 Nor can the location of desirable sites be hidden indefinitely. Furthermore, it does not appear that the enterprises working
in this field intend to stop their research and development.
4. J. FiLPsE and R.
ULES FROM THE DEEP

KAUFMAN,

PROGRESS IN

MANNG

MANGANESE

OCEAN, paper presented at "Oceanexpo 1971"

NOD-

(March

1971) 14-15.
5. Taylor, Worthless Nodules Become Valuable, OCEAN INDUSTRY 27-28
(June, 1971).
6. Deep-sea Mining Ship Planned by Global Marine, The Wall Street
Journal, Apr. 12, 1971.
7. ".... engineering studies and surveys of selected sites in the Pacific
Ocean have been made to assess their value as sources of minerals", Deep
Ocean Mining Planned by Hughes, Houston Chronicle, Jan. 17, 1971.
8. C.N.E.X.O., RAPPORT AN.UEL 1970, 19.
9. T. Shabad, Soviet Bloc Plans Big Seabed Study, New York Times,
Apr. 24, 1971.
10. See, e.g., Kennecott Exploration Inc.; C. Schatz, Observations of
Sampling and Occurrence of Manganese Nodules (Offshore Technology
Paper No. OTC 1364) (1971).
11. C.N.E.X.O., supra, note 8, at 20.
12. Deepsea Ventures, Inc., News Release (June, 1970).
13. See, e.g. (on dredges) "It is impossible for such benefits to be
completely internalized by patent protection, for neither knowledge diffusion nor imitative art can long be controlled." Sorensen and Mead, A
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Ocean Mineral Resource Development: The Case
of Manganese Nodules, 50 Am. J. AGRIC. EcoN. 1611, 1619 (1968).
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A further spur to settling a legal framework for deep sea mining was provided by the Moratorium Resolution of the Seabed
Committee and the General Assembly of the United Nations. Under the Moratorium Resolution,14 nations and persons were bound
to refrain from all exploitation of the seabed and ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction, pending the establishment of an international regime. The State Department regarded the Moratorium Resolution only as advisory. Its view that it did not anticipate any efforts to discourage American nationals from continuing
exploration plans for deep seabed minerals such as manganese
nodules'1 must have caused reflection among those in the industry
intent upon such exploitation. The State Department's views were
formulated in a draft Convention on the International Sea-Bed Area
presented to the Seabed Committee in August 1970.16

This draft,

is development orientated and assures some measure of certainty
for operating companies.1 7 The Petroleum Industry was not satisfied with the draft, despite the fact that present petroleum resources would lie in the International Trusteeship Area and therefore under the direct control of the coastal state.1 ' However, on International Seabed Resource Authority, to be created under the
draft, would be vested with considerable powers which could seriously affect private operators on the seabed. 19 It is therefore not
surprising that those concerned with deepsea mining, which would
take place in the area under international control, were not in
agreement with the State Department draft.
14. G.A. Res. 2574 D (XXIV) (1969), discussed in Auburn, Deep Sea
Mining, 15 ARcHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS 93 (1971).
15. Hearings before the Special Sub-committee on Outer Continental
Shelf of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong.
1st and 2nd sess. 210-211 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Hearings 1970).
16. Draft United Nations Convention on the InternationalSea-Bed Area:
Working Paper (United States) U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/25 (1970). It is suggested that the statement that the Convention and Appendices "do not
necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Government" may be attributed
to the Senate's views (hereinafter cited as Draft United Nations Convention).
17. Knight, The Draft United Nations Conventions on the International
Seabed Area: Background, Description and Some Preliminary Thoughts, 8
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 459 at 548-49 (1971).
18. National Petroleum Council, Petroleum Resources under the Ocean
Floor-A Supplemental Report 31 (1971).
19. E.g., Art. 40 (j) would give the Council power to issue emergency
orders to prevent serious harm to the marine environment: Auburn,
The International Seabed Area, 20 IWT'L & Comp. L.Q. 173, 188 (1971).

The American Mining Congress was well aware that this draft
was likely to be the most favourable regime possible, from their
point of view, if an international convention for the seabed is to be
promulgated at the Law of the Sea Conference in 1973. Two of the
papers presented to the Seabed Committee in 1971 define views
which find wide, if not overwhelming support among a majority of
members of the United Nations. The draft submitted by Tanzania 20
would establish an International Sea-bed Authority empowered to
explore and exploit the seabed by means of its own equipment and
services, 2 1 and a Council having wide powers of licensing and control.2 2 Until self-sufficient, administrative costs would be met
by members in conformity with the United Nations' scale of contributions, income would be distributed on the basis of equitable
sharing "to be determined by the Assembly." 23 As this Assembly
would be modelled upon the General Assembly of the United Nations, the distribution of revenue would presumably (and perhaps
rightly) favour the developing states. A working paper presented
24
by Chile and twelve other Central and South American states
would establish an enterprise to undertake all exploration and exploitation activities. 25 Wide powers would be given to an Assembly and Council, and the benefits from exploitation would be distributed equitably among all states, irrespective of geographical
location, with special consideration being given to developing
countries' needs. 2 6 It is not possible to review in detail the various
proposals before the Seabed Comnmittee, 27 but the general trend may
be gathered from the material presented here.
The ocean mineral industry, and the American Mining Congress,
could hardly view such proposals with favor. Few businessmen
would be willing to undertake a novel, risky and expensive enterprise under the daily supervision and control of an organisation
modelled upon the United Nations.
20. Draft Statute for an International Sea-Bed Authority (United Republic of Tanzania) U.N. Doe. 138/33 (1971).
21. Id. at Art. 16(1).
22. Id. at Art. 29.
23. Id. at Art. 33.
24. Working Paper on the Regime for the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor, and
The Subsoil Thereof Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (Chile,
Columbia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico,
Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela) U.N. Doc.
A/AC.138/49 (1971).
25. Id. at Art. 33.
26. Id. at Art. 4.
27. Particularly, the comprehensive draft covering all aspects of the law
of the sea presented by Dr. Pardo and submitted by Malta, U.N. Doc.
A/Ac.138/53 (1971).
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A concept which gained much support in industry, was that seabed minerals could be mined under existing international law,
through the development of custom by participating nations.28 In
June, 1970, Deepsea Ventures recommended that the United States
issue a unilateral declaration of intent to establish an interim national claims registry. Under the recommendations, other nations
undertaking deep sea mining would be urged to do likewise and
to enter into an agreement to respect the reasonable claims of all
nations on a basis of reciprocity. An International Registry Clearinghouse would be created and invested with recording duties. National jurisdiction would not be territorial, but confined to the purposes of exploration and exploitation for minerals. 29 A proposed
Deep Ocean Floor Resources Act would provide for U.S. licensing.
In September, 1970, T.S. Am of the American Mining Congress,
in testimony before a Senate Subcommittee80 submitted that ocean
mining demanded a secure investment climate and security of the
tenure of its claims beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. It
was suggested that control of the ocean activities by United States
citizens "might establish a customary pattern of rules and practices
that could be the basis for agreement with like-minded nations."8 1 A substantial outline of the provisions of the present
Bill was prepared by the American Mining Congress as part of its
comments upon the State Department draft, and sent to the Department of the Interior in January 1971.32 The resultant Metcalf Bill
thus presents a framework within which the United States ocean
mining industry believes that it can explore and exploit seabed
minerals with what it considers to be sufficient security for its
investments.
28. "If the nodules or other sea-bottom resources prove attractive
enough to justify the expense of harvesting and processing them, the accompanying evolution of international law may well take the form of an
agreement among the half-dozen nations capable of undertaking such huge
efforts." Ely, Legal Problems in Undersea Mineral Development, J. PET.
TEcH.237, 245 (1970).
29. J. Flipse and R. Greenwald, The Marine Operator's Role in the Rational Formulation of Principles of Law Governing Mining Activities in
'shared' Ocean Space, MAnum TEcHNOLOGY Socmrv (June/July, 1970).
30. Statement of T. Ary on behalf of the American Mining Congress in
Outer Continental Shelf, Hearings 1970, supra note 15 at 36, 37.
31. Hearings1970, supra note 15 at 38-39.
32. Letter from T.S. Ary to Hon. Hollis I. Dole, January 27, 1971
(Exhibit A).

The Bill would affect the "deep seabed," which is defined as the
seabed and the subsoil vertically below, lying seaward and outside
the continental shelf. 3 For the purposes of this Bill, the expanding continental shelf boundary is retained. In a Bill establishing
an interim regime it may well be considered wise not to raise the
question of defining the boundary between the continental shelf
and the seabed. But the Secretary of the Interior, in licensing, will
be forced to decide whether the area concerned comes within the
34
present Bill or within the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.
Such a decision will be necessary because, inter alia under the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the subsoil and seabed of that
area "appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control and power of disposition,13 5 whereas the seabed beyond the shelf is "not ... subject to appropriation by any means
by States ... and no State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or
sovereign rights over any part thereof."30 The provision that the
Secretary's issuance of any lease under the O.C.S. Act shall not
prejudice the ultimate settlement of the question whether or not
the area involved is in the Outer Continental Shelf;3 7 is of little
practical effect in the present context.38
Under the Bill no person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States shall directly or indirectly develop any portion of the deep
seabed except as authorized by license under the Act or by a reciprocating state.3 9 "Development" means any operation of exploration and exploitation, other than prospecting, having the purpose
of discovery, recovery, or delivery of hard minerals from the deep
seabed. 40 The Continental Shelf Convention's requirements of adjacency and exploitability have, in state practice, been reduced to
33. S. Res. 2801, supra note 1, § 2 (b).
34. Presuming that manganese nodules superjacent to the bed of the
sea are capable of coming within the definition of the Continental Shelf
Convention of shelf resources. On this question, see Auburn, New Zealand and the Seabed, 3 PACIFIC ColvuIuNTY, 313, at 322 (1972).
35. S. Res. 2801, supra note 1, § 3 (a).
36. G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV) (1970).
37. S. Res. 2801, supra note 1, § 8 (h).
38. The Department of the Interior has taken the position that the submerged land areas included in Outer Continental Shelf leases "are unquestionably within those areas over which the United States has exclusive
natural resource jurisdiction under the terms of the Convention; Dep't of
the Interior, Petroleum and Sulfur on the U.S. Continental Shelf 6 (1969).
39. S. Res. 2801, supra note 1, § 3.
40. § 2(e). "Indirect development" is mentioned in § 3, but not defined. One possibility is that a United States company participating in a
consortium incorporated in and based upon a non-reciprocating state may
be required to obtain a license under the Bill. This point would of course
be raised by enterprises already licensed under the Bill in a United States
court action under § 12 (a).
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exploitability widely defined. 41 The Continental Shelf Convention
demands that the "depth of the superjacent waters admits of the
exploitation of the natural resources."'4 2 Taking the test of superjacent waters it would appear that, since the tests by Deepsea Ventures and by the Japanese consortium at 3,760 metres, water depth
is no longer a bar to exploitation capabilities, and this is supported
by the plans for a full-scale commercial nodule processing plant for
1975 or 1976. Therefore manganese nodules may be considered capable of exploitation today. Promising mine sites appear to be situated, inter alia, between the continental United States and Hawaii. In such a location the United States would be the nearest
coastal state, and the mine site would therefore come within the
O.C.S. Act, as the present Bill contains no definition of the seaward
boundary of the United States Outer Continental Shelf. This argument would become even stronger when the exploitation stage
was actually reached. Therefore a license issued by the Secretary
under the proposed Bill would, insofar as it was granted for the
recovery of manganese nodules in the projected mining areas, automatically take the site out of the definition of "deep seabed" and
put it within the outer continental shelf. Thus, the effect of a license would be to place the licensed area outside the ambit of the
Bill.
This problem of shelf-seabed delineation is inherent in the Bill.
In the absence of a defined boundary between the deep seabed43
and the outer continental shelf44 confusion and litigation are inevitable. It may be presumed that the Bill's draftsmen sought to
avoid any suggestion of prejudging the United States position on
the seaward boundary of the outer continental shelf for the 1973
Conference on the Law of the Sea. However, even an interim
regime requires at least a general indication of boundaries.
41. Canadian state practice covers areas at least 300, and possibly 400
miles offshore, and United States, Australia and New Zealand licensing
does not lag far behind: Auburn, The 1973 Conference on the Law of the
Sea in the light of current trends in state seabed practice, AusTRALAsAN
LAW SCHOOLS AssOcIATioN CONFERENC 15-22 (August, 1971).
42. The Convention on the Continental Shelf, Art. 1. [1964] pt. 1 U.S.T.
471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958;
entered into force June 10, 1964.
43. Under the present Bill.
44. Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.

The boundary question becomes acute in the case of ocean
minerals on the seabed relatively close to the coastal state, but in
deep water outside the territorial sea. This problem is of course
especially relevant to the United States which still has a three mile
territorial sea.45 An instance of this problem is presented by the
Kauai Channel manganese deposits in waters 5,000 to 8,000 feet deep,
five to eight miles from the Kauai shoreline. It has been suggested
that these deposits may be worth billions of dollars and constitute
an economically important reserve which is relatively accessible.4"
An application by a United States company for a license under
the Bill to develop these deposits would present the Government
with difficult problems of international law. 47 The State Department has held that each island of the Hawaiian Archipelago has its
own three mile territorial sea, and that waters seaward of these
belts of territorial seas are high seas over which no State exercises
sovereignty.48 American courts have taken the same view.49
Therefore the Kauai Channel deposits, and possible seaward extensions, are regarded by the United States as outside its territorial
waters. A United States claim to seabed areas as continental shelf
at a depth of 8,000 feet in the Kauai Channel could be viewed as a
partial reversal of the United States stand against 200 mile territorial sea and archipelago claims50 and an encouragement for a fresh
round of extensive claims to the seabed. As the United States will
only agree to a twelve mile territorial sea accompanied by free transit through international straits, an extension of territorial waters
by this means must await ratification of a convention on these lines.
This conflict of interests between Hawaii and the Federal Government has already been foreseen by Hawaiian officials.5 ' The latent
Hawaiian archipelago claim will presumably be fought out between
the State and Federal Governments in due course. But if it were
raised in court, under the present Bill, the State Department's dip45. The United States proposal for a twelve mile territorial sea is linked
to freedom of navigation and overflight in, straits used for international
navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high
seas or the territorial sea of a foreign state: Art. II, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/
SC.Ir/L.40 (1971).
46. Morgenstein, Hawaii Institute of Geophysics, quoted in Manganese
on Ocean Floor, New Zealand Herald, Jan. 5, 1971.
47. See Comment, The Problem of Delimitationsof Base Lines for OutlVying Archipelagos, 9 SAN DiEao L. REv. - (1972).
48. WmTEwAN, 4 DiGEST OF INTEmATiONAL LAW 281 (1965).
49. E.g., in Island Airlines Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 352 F.2d 735
(1965).
50. There are indications that further archipelago claims may be made
following the example of Tonga.
51. OcsAw ScmNcE NEws (April 16, 1971).
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lomatic preparations for the Law of the Sea Conference would be
considerably embarrassed.
The Bill has taken from the Continental Shelf Convention the
description of the shelf as the "seabed and subsoil. '52 The Bill,
although primarily concerned with manganese nodules which are
the major mineral resource of the deep seabed of present interest
to an interim regime, does not define the boundary between the
"deep seabed" and the superjacent high seas-the epichthonic interface. 53 There is little difficulty with the expression "subsoil vertically below," which may be taken to cover the area beneath a national two dimensional "seabed". However, the Bill leaves unanswered the question whether the seabed has any depth, and if so,
how this is to be measured. As manganese nodules and manganese
deposits are found superjacent to the surface and resting upon it,
this question is of major importance to any would-be licensee. To
recover manganese nodules lying on the surface, a licensee must obtain a surface block "comprising not more than 40,000 square kilometers and extending downward from the seabed surface to a depth
of 10 meters."5 4 If the seabed has a "surface" it would appear to
have depth, but, if this is so, the boundaries are not defined. The
Secretary of the Interior would be empowered to issue licenses
which in regard to surface blocks "shall extend to manganese-oxide
nodules and all other hard minerals at the surface of the deep seabed or located vertically below to a depth not exceeding 10 meters." r5 Presumably the surface of the deep seabed here is that
same area previously referred to as the seabed surface. If so one of
the two definitions should be amended. There can be little doubt
that the draftsmen intended to cover manganese-oxide nodules lying on the surface, but this is not what the Bill states. "At the
surface" taken literally means embedded in the surface, but not
projecting above it.
This problem goes beyond a matter of draftsmanship. The Bill
is purely municipal legislation. As has already been shown, and
as will appear later, by ignoring the international law implications,
52. § 2 (b) of the Bill, and Art. 1 of the Convention.
53. A similar problem has arisen in the United States Seabed Draft:
See Auburn, supra note 18, at 199.
54. S.Res. 2801, supra note 1, § 2 (c).
55. Id. at § 4(a).

the Bill raises serious, and perhaps, insoluble conflicts. A principal
tenet of State Department policy has been that the freedom of the
high seas must be preserved. Thus the United States Draft Seabed
Convention provides that neither the Convention nor any rights
granted or exercised pursuant thereto, shall "affect the legal status
of the superjacent waters as high seas". 50 The present Bill ignores
this problem, but does not thereby solve it.
A licensee's rights are confined to "hard minerals ' 57 defined as
any mineral, metalliferous mud or other nonliving substance other
than oil, gas, hydrocarbons and any other substance which both
naturally occurs and is normally recovered in liquid or gaseous
form. 58 It would therefore appear that metalliferous brines such as
those in the Red Sea will not come within the Bill if they (a) are
suspended in liquid and (b) are normally recovered in liquid form.
As present suggestions indicate that liquid recovery is feasible, 9
such brines, in liquid form, would not come within the scope of the
Bill if situated at either the surface or under the seabed. Brines
forming part of the seas above the seabed are not part of the "deep
seabed" under the Bill and clearly do not come within the Bill. It
may therefore be asked why the term "metalliferous mud" was
added to "any mineral" if the latter includes the former. Perhaps
the draftsmen of the Bill intended to include Red Sea type brines, on
the one hand, but on the other hand wished to carefully exclude any
liquid substance in any way related to oil and gas. Legislation to
cover the Red Sea brines has proved difficult to draft comprehensively 0 and if the present Bill is to cover similar minerals which
are likely to be discovered elsewhere it is suggested that special
provision should be explicitly made to ensure that brine minerals
are covered. Under the present Bill it is possible that the Secretary
would have power to license brine mineral exploitation at a site insofar as the minerals were both within the seabed and did not
naturally occur in liquid form. A licensee might then be subject
to the regime of the Bill after an International Seabed Convention
came into force,0 ' for that part of brine minerals coming within the
definition of "hard minerals" under the Bill. At the same time, exploitation of superjacent brine minerals, naturally occuring and
56. Draft United Nations Convention, supra note 16, at Art. 6.
57. S. Res. 2801, supra note 1, § 4(a).
58. Id. at § 2 (d).
59. Boes and Bade, A System for the recovery of heavy metal sediments from the Red Sea Brines, 3 UNDERWAT R JoURNAL 220 (1971).

60. See, for instance, Law relating to the Acquisition of the Red Sea Re-

sources, 1968, sanctioned by Royal Decree M/27 of October 1, 1968 (Saudi
Arabia).
61. Presuming that § 10 (a) of the Bill was enacted.
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normally recoverable in liquid form, would be directly subject to
the possibly quite different regime of the Convention without the
protection of the Bill.
It would appear possible, in theory, for persons subject to United
States jurisdiction to engage in a number of different types of exploitation in one area, under the scheme formulated by the Bill(a) a surface block (b) a subsurface block (c) oil or gas in a surface
block (d) oil or gas in a subsurface block (e) liquid mineral brines
in a surface block (f) liquid mineral brines in sea-water. This
hypothetical list does not include various other activities such as
deep drilling for scientific research, anti-submarine devices or environmental research. This is not so much a question of multiple
uses, like fairways between oil rigs, but of complicated procedures
involving conflicts of national and international authority and uncertainty as to tenure.
Unlike the resources of the continental shelf, minerals of the seabed are not vested in the coastal state, or in any state, for that matter. The General Assembly has declared the resources of the seabed to be the common heritage of mankind and that no state or person shall claim, exercise or acquire rights with respect to these re62 It
sources incompatible with the future international regime.
may be logically assumed, therefore, that no state may claim or exercise sovereign rights over the resources of the seabed, and this position has been specifically advocated by the United States.63 The
Bill does not vest title to the minerals in the miner, under the projected United States law.6 4
The Bill does attempt to provide for a limited measure of international recognition. It has been suggested that an interim regime
among like-minded nations, a type of functional regionalism, would
be an acceptable alternative to a United Nations seabed regime if
present negotiations fail, and, in any case, might serve as a testing
ground for theory and development of customary practice.6 5 The
American Mlining Congress has pointed out that an interim re62. G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV) (1970).
63. Draft United Nations Convention, supra note 16, at Art. 2(1).
64. See also Greenwald, Problems of Legal Security of the World Hard
Minerals Industry in the International Ocean, OrFsuoRE TECHNOLOGY CON-

4-5 (April, 1971).
65. Id. at 6.

FmE

gime "might establish a customary pattern of rules and practices
that could be the basis for agreement with like-minded nations." 0
The Bill permits the Secretary to issue licenses recognizing rights
exclusive against all persons subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States or of any reciprocating state. 67 "Person" means any
government or unit thereof and any juridicial or natural person."
A license shall be issued to the first qualified person making written
application and tendering 5,000 dollars per block. "Qualified persons"
means a citizen of the U.S. or a corporation or other juridical entity
organized under the laws of the U.S. meeting prescribed technical
and financial requirements."9
A "reciprocating state" is any foreign state designated by the
President as a state having legislation or state practice or agreements with the United States which establish an interim policy and
°
practice comparable to that of the United States under the BillY
71
Reciprocating developing states will be aided by the escrow fund.
Any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States may
be enjoined from directly or indirectly violating the Bill.7 2 These
provisions affecting licensees and permitting the establishment of
an international system are of great interest.
The definition of persons qualified to obtain licenses under the
Bill is limited to United States citizens and juridical entities. It
is not clear whether this is wide enough to include the Federal Government. Even if this is so, the Bill makes no provision for nondevelopmental uses of ocean minerals, such as the reserving of specific areas as strategic reserves of minerals.
The technical and financial requirements for licensees are not
defined by the Bill. The National Petroleum Council submitted
that the fees and other payments and expenditures laid down by
the United States Draft Convention were too high.78 The present
Bill sets very low license fees 74 and minimum annual expenditures.7 5 It is difficult to understand why the technical and financial requirements, which are of equal importance to licensees, are
not specified in the Bill. Such provisions are also required to en66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See note 31, supra.
S. Res. 2801, supranote 1, § 4 (a).
Id. at § 2(h).
Id. at § 5(a).
Id. at § 2(i).

71. Id. at § 9.

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at § 12(a).
See Nat'l Petroleum Council, supranote 18, at 29.
S. Res. 2801, supra note 1, § 5 (a).
Id. at § 7.
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able other countries to adopt similar rules and become reciprocating
states. Furthermore, the President must decide whether the rules
of other states are "comparable,"7 6 which may be difficult if the
United States rules are not clear.
Although the Secretary may only issue licenses to American citizens and juridical entities, "any person subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States '' 77 may be enjoined from directly or indirectly violating the Bill or any regulations thereunder, interfering with licensed development or removing hard minerals without the permission of the licensee. In view of the large amounts of minerals to
be produced, one likely source of friction may well prove to be international trade practices. In this field, courts of the United States
have assumed jurisdiction over the activities of foreign enterprises7 8 under circumstances in which both foreign courts79 and
commentators 0 have regarded United States courts as jurisdictionally improper fora. In the absence of stated limitations on the
courts' jurisdiction, the foreigner can only assume that similar
views will be applied to cases under the present Bill. Should a
reciprocating state have an even wider definition of persons subject to its jurisdiction, it may be presumed that United States courts
will follow the scheme of the Bill and adopt such a definition.
One of the basic aims of the Bill is to encourage other states to
adopt uniform rules. The criterion for designating states as reciprocating is that of "an interim policy and practice comparable" to
that of the United States. This subjective test is too general to be
relied upon as a basis for a coherent body of international rules.
If Shakespeare could compare his love to a summer's day, any
comparison drawn by the President of the United States, as to the
seabed mineral regime, must remain wholly within the bounds
of speculation. Would a Soviet Act establishing a state corporation
with exclusive powers to develop deep sea minerals be comparable
to the present Bill? Many, and quite diverse, licensing systems are
indeed "comparable". The fault with this definition is that it does
not expressly indicate which elements of the United States legisla76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
7arAF

Id. at § 2(1).
Id. at § 12(a).
United States Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (1945).
Cf. British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. I.C.I. Ltd. [1955] Ch. 37.
E.g., Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdictionin International Law, REcuCouis at 100-08 (1964).

tion must be present in the rules of another state's system in order
for the latter to qualify as a reciprocating state. At present it is
suggested that the state practice of all developed states capable of
exploiting deep sea minerals places them within this wide definition.
In view of the vagueness of the definition of a reciprocating state,
it is quite clear that there would be large differences between the
rules in the various reciprocating states. States not having ocean
mining capacity, including developing and landlocked states, can
qualify as reciprocating states. Presumably they may do this by
enacting legislation along the lines of the present Bill. If this were
done it would be difficult for the United States to refuse them
reciprocating status. A United States company could then form a
foreign subsidiary in the state offering inducements such as lower
financial requirements than that demanded by the United States.
The Bill's licensing conditions must be viewed against the background of comments made by the petroleum and hard minerals industry on the United States Draft Convention. It has been suggested that the rental fee would retard development and should be
eliminated, 8' but, on the other hand, work commitments would encourage exploration.82 The American Mining Congress viewed the
fees, rentals, and bonuses as excessive and forming a "large front
load." 83 The Congress later suggested that measures should be
taken to avoid the acquisition of large contiguous blocks 4 and
suggested a "nominal registration fee." 85 The National Petroleum
Council prepared a detailed table comparing the petroleum license
conditions under the State Department Draft with illustrative current provisions,8 6 according to which the Draft's requirements in
fees, work obligations, production bonuses and production payments
were substantially in excess of current petroleum industry practice.
The license conditions of the present Bill are of special significance, representing the first detailed plan put forward by a substantial portion of the ocean minerals industry, setting out the financial provisions under which it believes that ocean mining may
be economical.
Under the Bill, a license would be in force for 15 years.87 If corn-

81. Drechsler, The Value of Subsea Mineral Resources, LAW
SEA LwsTnUTE CoNrmmCE (June 21-24, 1971) at 14.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 15.
See Hearings1970, supranote 30, at 41.
See Letter, supra note 32, at 9.
Id. at 15.
See National Petroleum Council, supra note 18, at 29.
S. Res. 2801, supra note 1, § 4 (c).
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mercial recovery is reached within this time, the license shall continue in force as long as commercial recovery continues.8 8 Commercial recovery is defined as recovery at a substantial rate of production, regardless of profit or loss, for the primary purpose of marketing or commercial use.8 9 This term is considerably clearer than
the parallel "exploitation" in the State Department Draft.90
Abandonment of the distinction between exploration and exploitation is a welcome step forward to the divorce of seabed terminology
from the notably unclear vocabulary of the continental shelf. The
license fee of 5,000 dollars 91 is slightly more than the current petroleum provisions described by the National Petroleum Council as
nominal.92 Minimal development expenditure on a 10,000 square
kilometers surface block for fifteen years is 1,350,000 dollars.98 In
this sum is included off-site expenditure on operations, facilities or
equipment directly related to development of the licensed block. A
manganese nodule enterprise may well require only one surface
block license. In such a case a large proportion of its off-site expenditure would be directly related to development of that block.
The minimal annual expenditures provided would not then provide
a clear impetus to speedy mineral development.
Licenses could be revoked for wilful substantial failure to comply with the Bill, regulations or license conditions, in United States
District Court proceedings provided the Secretary has given written notice of the violation, and it has not been remedied within a
reasonable period of that notice. 94 It can safely be assumed that a
licensee with an investment of 200,000,000 dollars will contest any
attempted revocation to the bitter end. United States court cases
with international implications have been known to take a considerable amount of time.9 5 This procedure is quite inconsistent
with any workable rules to prevent major damage to the marine en88. Id.
89. S. Res. 2801, supra note 1, § 2 (g).
90. Draft United Nations Convention, supra note 16 at Art. 75 (7) discussed in Auburn, supra note 19, at 184-86.
91. S. Res. 2801, supra note 1, § 5 (a).
92. See Nat'l Petroleum Council, supra note 18, at 29.
93. S. Res. 2801, supra note, § 7. The block area is reduced by 75%
within ten years under § 8 (a).
94. Id. at § 8 (b).
95. E.g., the municipal proceedings in the Interhandel Case [1959] I.C.J.
5.

vironment.9 6

Possible types of environmental damage have been

suggested, such as the leaching of elements leading to dangerous
concentrations in aquatic organisms, 97 but much research will be
needed to define and regulate such hazards. No provision is made
for non-wilful substantial failure to comply with the prescribed
rules. It might well be suggested that the fault principle has no
place in regulating a large-scale mining industry using completely
new techniques in a hostile environment.
The sole licensing authority under the Bill is the Secretary of the
Interior. It is difficult to understand why the Department of Commerce, and in particular its National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (N.O.A.A.) 9s have no status whatsoever under the
Bill. A vast amount of preparatory work99 and debate went into
the establishment of N.O.A.A., and ocean mining is one of the fields
in which its work is of importance. Defense interests are not even
mentioned under licensing conditions. There is no mention of
ocean dumping. Can the licensee deposit wastes in the ocean? If
limits are to be placed on waste disposal, it is submitted that they
should be prescribed in the Bill, as this is a matter of importance
to the United States,10 0 and the source of considerable present controversy.
The only areas in which licensing conditions are detailed are fees
and expenditures, and aggregation of blocks. It is clearly very difficult to lay down detailed guide-lines for licensing in regard to
defence, scientific research, the environment and other areas, but
this is not a sufficient reason to leave such vital matters to administrative rulings.
The surface block which is the licensing unit for manganese
nodule mining conists of 40,000 square kilometers,' 0 ' to be reduced
to 10,000 square kilometers within ten years. 02 But after ten
96. Contrast the proposed powers of the International Seabed Resource
Authority's Council to take emergency action to prevent serious harm to
the marine environment in the State Department Draft Convention:
supra, note 16, § .40 (j).
97. U.N. Doe. A/7924 (1970) at 5.
98. As one example of N.O.A.A. activity in this area, its Marine Minerals
Technology Center (M.M.T.C.) is spending substantial sums on assessing
the possible effects of marine mining on the environment. White, Federal Plan for EnvironmentalPrediction59 (1971).
99. E.g., Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources,
OuR NATiOT AND THE SEA (1969).

100. cf. United States Draft Convention on Ocean Dumping, 10 IzW'L
TEGAL lATE1ams 1021 (1971).

101. § 2 (c) of the Bill.
102. Id. at § 8 (a).
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years the licensee may hold 10,000 square kilometers areas from
four adjacent blocks, 10 3 making a total of 40,000 square kilometers.
Deepsea Ventures project exploration objectives are "twenty year"
mine sites of about 2,600 square kilometers' 04 and "is ready to file a
claim on a specific ore body now".'0 5 Presuming that the United
States has licensed such an aggregated block, what will happen if a
non-reciprocating state, or a national of such a state, begins development in the same area, or even on the same mining sites?
Under § 4 (a) of the Bill licenses are only exclusive as against all
persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and reciprocating states. It is submitted that in such circumstances full United
States government support would be given to the United States licensee whose investment is worth at least 200,000,000 dollars. Such
government backing, which is not mentioned in the Act, is virtually
assured by § 10, under which the government, for a premium, would
guarantee to reimburse the licensee "for any loss caused through any
interference by any other person," with the licensee's development.
The licensee's loss would be passed on to the United States Government. It is difficult to suggest an actuarial basis upon which such a
premium could be calculated. 0 6
Under these conditions an aggregated license would permit the
licensee to develop blocks of 40,000 square kilometers for an indefinite period. 0 7 It is submitted that the Bill is therefore in direct
conflict with the Moratorium Resolution,'0 " as it categorically provides for exploitation of the seabed pending the establishment of
an international regime. 0 9 From the point of view of the United
States government this objection may not be vital. The State Department regards the Moratorium Resolution as recommendatory
and does not anticipate efforts to discourage its nationals from exploration for manganese nodules.1 0
103. Id.
104. Rothstein, Deep Ocean Nodule Mining, UNDERWATER SCiEcE AND
TECHNOLOGY JouNIuAL, 133, 134 (1970).
105. Greenwald, supra note 64, at 3.
106. It is also possible that non-reciprocating states' nationals may be
held to be "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States". See text
accompanying note 78 supra.
107. "...
so long as commercial recovery from the block continues."
See S. 2801, supranote 1, § 4 (c).
108. G.A. Res. 2574D (XXIV) (1969), supranote 14.
109. Id. at 93.
110. See Hearings 1970, supra note 15.

A weightier objection is that the control of so large an area for an
indefinite period under the protection of the United States government constitutes the exercise or acquisition of rights with respect
to the seabed and its resources which is incompatible with a future
international regime."1
The only international authority in the Bill is the "international
registry clearinghouse", an agency designated by the President in
cooperation with reciprocating states. 112 Its functions would
consist solely of keeping records of license applications and dealings
with licenses. 1 13 If the regime established by the Bill is not in fact
interim, but of long duration, if not permanent, 114 the clearinghouse
cannot be reconciled with the frequently repeated view of the General Assembly that an international seabed regime shall be established "including appropriate international machinery to give effect
to its provisions."" 15
The seabed debate in the United Nations is to a large degree due to
the proposals which favor giving a part of the expected revenues
to the developing states. The Bill provides for an escrow fund for
"assistance", as Congress may direct, to developing reciprocating
states. An unnamed percentage of United States license fees and
income tax directly attributable to hard minerals recovery is to be
deposited in this fund. A developing reciprocating state means a
reciprocating state designated by the President, taking into consideration per capita gross national product and "other appropriate criteria."116
Developed reciprocating states undertaking or licensing development stand to gain considerable advantages from the Bill. Their
licensees will be protected as against United States nationals
and other persons subject to the United States jurisdiction, before United States courts." 7 In addition, the United States government will have a very large financial stake of its own as guarantor
of American licensees' operations. As the Bill would establish a
system of interdependence among reciprocating states active in
mining, the United States government will also have a large stake
in the system itself, and will no doubt be called upon to assist
111. G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV) (1970).
112. S. Res. 2801, supra note 1, § 2(i).
113. Id. at § 5 (c).
114. On which see text for note 133, infra.
115. The quotation is taken from Res. 2749, supra note 111. The United
States Seabed Draft contains detailed provision for international machinery, supra note 16.
116. S. Res. 2801, supra note 1, § 9.
117. Id. at § 12.
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in the defense of reciprocating states' licensees as against nonreciprocating states. It may also be suggested that the United
States government will be called upon to intervene on behalf
of operations by subsidiaries of United States companies under
flags of convenience. 1 "
It does not appear that United States payments to the escrow
fund would involve any additional expenditure by the licensee.
The govermnent would in effect be making the payments to the
fund from the license fees (which would be nominal) and tax receipts. The fund would be used for "assistance".119 If, as this term
would indicate, the fund is considered part of the United States
foreign aid programme, the government will actually save money if
it does not increase foreign aid by the equivalent of its contribution
to the escrow fund. The "appropriate criteria" to be fulfilled by developing states, to qualify, are far from clear. It may be presumed
that states not recognised by the United States would not qualify.
Another criterion for exclusion, in the present context, could be
that the state has recently nationalised investments of the United
States or of a reciprocating state without adequate compensation.
This category would exclude a large number of influential developing states. Such nationalisation might also be considered to render
the policy and practice of the state concerned not comparable with
that of the United States. That state would therefore be outside
the definition of a reciprocating state.1 20 It may be assumed that
this pressure point will not be ignored by companies whose invest2
ments have been nationalised.' 1
It is clear from the Bill that any developing reciprocating state
so designated by the President could receive funds. Assistance
shall be "as Congress may hereafter direct". There is no indication of criteria for the allocation of funds, nor the purposes for
which funds may be allocated. 1 22 Could such funds be tied to the
118. A recent example of action in such a case, by the United Kingdom,
was taken at the request of the British captain of the Liberian registered
"Central Asia": Crazed Chef moves Navy, Auckland Star, December 15,
1971.
119. S. Res. 2801, supra note 1, § 9.
120. As defined by § 2 (i).
121. The escrow fund might then be a much more effective weapon
than the Hickenlooper Amendment has proved to be.
122. Cf. Art. 5 of the Draft United Nations Convention, supra note 16.

purchase of United States' goods? Could they be used to purchase
military requirements, thus substituting for American military aid?
Developed states, whether reciprocating or not, which did not license deep seabed mineral development, would obtain no benefits
from the system established by the Bill. No incentives, economic or
otherwise, are expressly contained within the Bill for those nations which are not either (a) developed states licensing exploitation and having policies comparable to the United States, or (b)
developing states offering a flag of convenience. The benefits to
"developing reciprocating state" are represented by a fund whose
resources are not defined, further payment is subject to future direction by Congress, and nomination for such status is dependent
upon criteria to be laid down by the President in the future. Whatever benefits may arise will be "assistance" which does not promise to increase present aid levels. This portion of the Bill would offer no incentive to the vast majority of states. On the contrary, it
could only encourage them to continue their efforts to establish an
active international seabed regime. Even the possibly illusory
benefits of an international seabed authority with powers to exploit minerals must be more attractive to most states than the
benefits under this Bill.
From the point of view of the ocean mining industry the most
important provisions of the Bill relate to investment protection.
The American Mining Congress regards a secure investment climate and security of tenure as the most serious needs. 128 The Congress is particularly concerned with Art. 73 of the United States
Seabed Draft as licensing conditions under the future international
regime are unknown and the Article implies that other states could
grant seabed licenses to be recognised by the regime thus giving the
licensees priority over United States enterprises. 124 The concern
expressed by the Congress may be reinforced by the terms in which
the government has already licensed seabed activity.1 25
Licenses issued under the Bill may be made subject to any future
international regime agreed to by the United States provided the
123. Hearings 1970, supra note 30.
124. Letter, supra note 2, at 4.
125. "In accordance with the policy statement of the President dated
May 23, 1970, exploration permits issued pursuant to Section 11 of the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 pertaining to areas of the seabed
beyond the depth of 200 meters are subject to the provisions of any future
treaty, regarding the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources

of these areas, to which the United States is a party. Accordingly, this

permit is subject to the policy conditions incorporated in that statement."
OCS Permit E 3-70 (June 29, 1970).
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regime fully recognizes and protects the exclusive rights of licensees
to develop blocks for the term of the license, and further provided
that the United States fully reimburses licensees for any investment loss or increased cost incurred within forty years of issue of
the license due to conditions of the regime more burdensome than
those of the Bill. The United States shall bear "any payment of
whatever kind required of the licensee under the international regime." 126 For an undetermined premium the United States shall
insure licensees for any loss caused through any interference by
any other persons "whether or not violative of international law"
with development under a license and from any loss caused by recovery of minerals from the block by any person not authorised
by the licensee. 127 It is not proposed to analyse in full the details
of these provisions, 28 but rather to consider their effect as a whole.
As has been previously pointed out, 2 9 a license under the Bill
may be in force for an indefinite period after commercial recovery
has been achieved. The system set up by the Bill will continue to
function unless, or until, the United States ratifies a future Seabed
Convention. Even if the Convention is thus ratified licenses under
the Bill would only be subject to the Convention if it "fully recognizes and protects" development rights under licenses.
On one estimate the capital cost of an efficient production unit
processing about 1,000,000 tons of dry nodules per year is 180,000,000
dollars. 80 Such a unit would yield each year 279,000 tons of manganese, 14,000 tons of copper, 14,400 tons of nickel and 2,880 tons of
cobalt.' 3 1 Large capital requirements per unit and the significant
percentage of world requirements produced will limit the number
of units. Under the Bill licensees must pay a 5,000 dollar license
fee plus 1,750,000 dollar total minimum expenditure to secure a
block. The rapid progress of United States, and Japanese research,
together with the entry of France and the Soviet Union into the
126. S. Res. 2801, supra note 1, § 10 (a).
127. Id. at § 10 (b).
128. For instance it appears that the United States would be liable to
reimburse its licensees for pollution fines imposed by the international
authority.

("... any payment of whatever kind...").

129. See text accompanying note 88, supra.
130. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor
Beyond the Limit of National Jurisdiction (statement by Dr. V.E. Mckelvey,
Subcommittee I) at 3. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SCI (1971).
131. Id.

field, suggest that a number of promising blocks would be licensed
immediately under the system set up by the Bill. The total expenditure for each 10,000 square kilometer block or fifteen years, before
commercial recovery, is approximately 1% of the estimated capital
required for a single processing unit.
Clearly the expected return on capital must be far greater than
1% to justify investment. The financial requirements of the Bill
therefore further encourage immediate applications for licenses.
As it will be only economically feasible, on present forecasts, to
develop a limited number of mining sites, the Bill would set up a
system which would endure, at least for United States miners, for
a number of years, regardless of the establishment of an international regime. The United States government would, under the
Bill, guarantee its licensees, both directly, and by insurance, against
losses due to more burdensome provisions of an international regime.
Several proposals before the Seabed Committee would set up an international authority having powers of exploitation. 132 Therefore
the possible losses to be indemnified by the United States government under the Bill could reach the total investment by a licensee,
together with loss of future profits. On one recent estimate, the
net present value of ten years' revenue from one nodule operation
processing 1,800,000 tons per year would be 564,000,0000 dollars. 1 8
To pay the sums due to a number of licensees under the Bill, if the
international regime were to take over exploitation, would involve
the United States government in a minimum outlay of several hundred million dollars, and a maximum of well over a billion dollars.
These amounts would be reduced to the extent to which the international regime approached the requirements of the Bill, but it is
difficult to envision the General Assembly of the United Nations
subscribing to a system similar to that of the Bill.
The Bill is therefore far from an interim regime. The Bill would
provide full protection, at several levels, for the licenses granted
under it. Section 10 ensures that licenses shall prevail against the
provisions of an international regime, and that any losses of any
kind shall be borne by the United States government. If Congress
is asked to approve an international regime involving an indemnity
of several hundred million dollars to United States licensees, it is
difficult to envision its agreement, other objections apart. It is
submitted that the present Bill provides a regime of a semi-perma132. See text accompanying notes 21 and 24 supra.
133. Hubred, New Slant on the Economy of Manganese Nodules, OcrEx
ImuusTaY 26, 27 (August 1970).
Other estimates suggest even larger returns: Mero, A Legal Regime for Deep Sea Mining, 7 SAi DIEGo L. RE.
488 at 497 (1970).
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nent nature, insulated at several levels from the possible effect of
a future seabed convention. There would then be little point in
having an international regime for ocean minerals.
The Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Bill is a carefully
framed code for exploitation of ocean minerals by United States industrial enterprises, under government protection. But for the vast
majority of states who do not have the technological capabilities or
capital to take part in mining, it offers no benefits from the area
which the General Assembly holds to be the common heritage of
mankind.

